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Summary
Gaze direction is an important social signal in both human
and nonhuman primates, providing information about
conspecifics’ attention, interests, and intentions [1–4].
Single-unit recordings in macaques have revealed neurons
selective for others’ specific gaze direction [5, 6]. A parallel
functional organization in the human brain is indicated by
gaze-adaptation experiments, in which systematic distor-
tions in gaze perception following prolonged exposure to
static face images reveal dynamic interactions in local
cortical circuitry [7, 8]. However, our understanding of the
influence of high-level social cognition on these processes
in monkeys and humans is still rudimentary. Here we show
that the attribution of a mental state to another person deter-
mines the way in which the human brain codes observed
gaze direction. Specifically, we convinced observers that
prerecorded video sequences of an experimenter gazing
left or right were a live video link to an adjacent room. The
experimenter woremirrored goggles that observers believed
were either transparent such that the person could see, or
opaque such that the person could not see. The effects of
adaptation were enhanced under the former condition rela-
tive to the latter, indicating that high-level sociocognitive
processes shape and modulate sensory coding of observed
gaze direction.
Results and Discussion
The sensitivity of many neurons decreases in response to
prolonged stimulation, and such adaptation has proven a
powerful tool for relating neurophysiology to perception
[9, 10]. Adaptation is frequently evident as aftereffects, specific
and measurable distortions of perception that reflect reduced
contributions of adapted processes. Initially only reported for
basic aspects of vision, recent studies have demonstrated
aftereffects for more sophisticated processes underpinning
perception of facial identity and gestures [11–13]. In one
example, the effects of adaptation have been exploited to
study the human gaze-processing system, demonstrating
that after prolonged exposure to a person looking in a particular
direction, subsequent gaze-direction judgment is biased in the
opposite direction [7, 8, 14–17]: adaptation to a leftward-gazing
face distorts estimation of subsequently presented gaze direc-
tion rightward, and the converse pattern obtains following
adaptation to a rightward-gazing face. Such psychophysical
assessments of gaze-direction aftereffects indicate the exis-
tence of distinct populations of neurons coding specifically
*Correspondence: crt35@cam.ac.uk (C.T.), gjd1000@cam.ac.uk (G.D.)for different observed gaze directions. Moreover, recent
experiments combining adaptation and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) have localized the blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) signal correlates of these aftereffects
in the human superior temporal sulcus (STS) [7], lending
support to the notion that the gaze-adaptation paradigm to a
certain extent constitutes a noninvasive human analog to the
single-unit recording employed by Perrett and colleagues in
the macaque brain [5, 6].
Here, we do not revisit issues concerning the anatomical loci
associated with these adaptable processes but rather seek to
describe the environmental features that they encode. Several
influential reports have suggested that STS neurons code
where another individual is directing their visual attention—
suggesting that they may play a role in the processing of others’
mental states rather than simply coding the physical features of
eye or head orientation [5, 18]. However, previous studies have
stopped short of directly manipulating the observers’ belief of
whether or not a face stimulus can see, an experiment that
could directly show that input from mental-state attribution is
incorporated into the gaze-processing system. According to
this view, such a manipulation should exert a powerful modula-
tory effect on adaptation to gaze (and hence on the magnitude
of the gaze-direction aftereffect).
In order to guarantee the participants’ attribution of mental
states to the face stimuli, we employed an elaborate deception
procedure, convincing observers that prerecorded videos
showing the faces of two experimenters on a computer screen
were a live video link to two adjoining rooms. The observers
thus believed they were interacting with two real people in
the experiment. They were first adapted to the face of one
experimenter (adaptation model) looking into a particular
direction and subsequently had to judge a second experi-
menter’s gaze direction (test model) (Figure 1). To directly
manipulate the mental state that the observers attributed to
the adaptation model, the model wore either a blue or a yellow
pair of goggles, both with highly mirrored lenses such that it
was impossible to see the eyes of the wearer. From the
perspective of the person wearing the goggles, however, one
pair was transparent and the other was completely opaque.
Prior to the experiment, half of the participants experienced
that they could see through the yellow pair of goggles but
not through the blue pair, and vice versa for the other half.
While watching the video clips, they therefore believed that
when wearing one pair of goggles, the adaptation model could
see (seeing condition), whereas with the other pair, the model
was not able to see (nonseeing condition). Participants were
thus encouraged to attribute a specific sensory capability to
the adaptation model (but no mental contents). After this
adaptation phase, the observers’ acuity in judging the gaze
direction of the test model was assessed.
Observers’ gaze-direction judgments differed following
adaptation to leftward versus to rightward gaze, indicating
an influence of adaptation on gaze processing (Figure 2A).
Crucially, this effect was only present when observers believed
that the model was wearing transparent goggles and could
see, but was absent when they believed that the model was
wearing opaque goggles and could not see. A 2 3 2 3 3
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Procedure
All examples show adaptation to rightward gaze
by the adaptation model. As a result of an elabo-
rate deception procedure, observers believed
they were interacting with two real people con-
nected to the screen via a live video link during
the experiment. Observers were first adapted to
the face of the adaptation model with the head
turned 25 to look either to the left or the right
(adaptation phase) and subsequently had to
judge the second experimenter’s gaze direction
by pressing a response button to indicate right-
ward, straight, or leftward gaze (postadaptation
acuity test). Three categories of test stimuli were
used, showing the test model with the head
pointing straight ahead and the eyes directed 5
to the left, straight ahead, or 5 to the right.
Top-up adaptation stimuli were used to maintain
adaptation during the test. The signals on the
screen during the intertrial intervals (ITI) were
presented in order to maintain the impression
that the prerecorded video clips were a live video
link to two adjoining rooms. All observers participated in the seeing and the nonseeing condition, with half of them believing that the adaptation model was
able to see through the yellow goggles but not through the blue ones, and half believing the reverse. Within each condition, observers’ gaze-direction judg-
ments were tested after adaptation to both leftward and rightward gaze of the adaptation model in two separate sessions. Note that all observers watched
the same set of video clips. Across observers, the only manipulation that varied consistently was the observers’ belief concerning the ability of the
adaptation model to see through the goggles.repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) (condition
[seeing versus nonseeing]3adaptation side [left versus right]3
test stimulus [5 left, straight, or 5 right]) confirmed these
impressions. There was a significant main effect of adaptation
side (F(1,19) = 7.61, p < 0.05) and test stimulus (F(1,19) =
2096.53, p < 0.001) and no effect of condition (F < 1). Impor-
tantly, however, there was a significant adaptation side 3
condition interaction (F(1,19) = 5.90, p < 0.05), indicating that
the effect of adaptation was influenced by the observers’ belief
concerning the adaptation model’s ability to see. All other inter-
actions were not significant.
To reveal the source of the interaction, we analyzed the
seeing and nonseeing data separately via 2 3 3 repeated-
measures ANOVAs. As expected, both analyses yielded signif-
icant main effects of test stimulus (both F(1,19)s > 1015.96, p <
0.001) and no interaction term (both Fs < 1). Crucially, however,
the analysis of the seeing condition yielded a main effect of
adaptation side (F(1,19) = 17.59, p < 0.001), whereas this was
not the case for the nonseeing condition (F(1,19) = 1.31, NS).
In line with previous work, we also conducted planned Wil-
coxon signed-rank tests to assess adaptation at each level
of the test stimulus factor. For the seeing condition, significant
influences of adaptation side were observed for test stimuli
facing 5 right (Z = 2.46, p < 0.05) and straight ahead (Z = 2.23,
p < 0.05), but not for test stimuli facing 5 left (Z = 0.92, NS).
In the nonseeing condition, no effect of adaptation side
was observed in any of the three categories of test stimuli
(all Zs < 1.03, NS).
Experiment 1 thus provided initial evidence suggesting that
gaze processing is influenced by an observer’s attribution
of the mental state ‘‘seeing,’’ as opposed to ‘‘nonseeing,’’ to
another person. This conclusion has one caveat. Observers’
attention to the display as a whole had been maintained by
a ‘‘sham’’ task during the adaptation phase—two asterisks
briefly flashed up to the left and right of the model’s face,
and participants had to respond as quickly as possible by
pressing a button. However, the locations of these asterisks
did not permit us measuring whether attention was allocatedequally to the adaptation model’s face in the seeing versus
the nonseeing conditions. Accordingly, though there was no
a priori reason to assume that this had happened, it remained
possible to account for the results of experiment 1 by positing
that the participants allocated more attention to a ‘‘seeing’’
than to a ‘‘nonseeing’’ face.
In order to address this issue, we conducted a second
experiment. The key innovation in experiment 2 was that in
half of the trials during the adaptation phase, an asterisk briefly
flashed up in one of twelve different locations distributed over
the eye region of the adaptation model, rather than to either
side of the face. The task for the observers was to indicate
the appearance of the asterisk as quickly as possible by a
button press. The response times were used as a refined
measure of attention allocated to the face of the adaptation
model. We also used a novel set of videos showing a new
adaptation model and a new test model. This allowed us to
additionally address why no aftereffect was observed in
response to test faces gazing 5 left in the seeing condition
in experiment 1. If this aberrant result reflected a new lateral-
ized component in gaze processing specific to mental-state
attribution, then it should arise again with these new stimuli.
Conversely, if the same result did not arise, we could dismiss
the result in experiment 1 as simply a reflection of subtle unin-
tended biases in our test stimuli.
The results of experiment 2 showed a pattern similar to
those of the previous experiment (Figure 2B). An ANOVA iden-
tical to the primary analysis of experiment 1 yielded significant
main effects of adaptation side (F(1,15) = 29.29, p < 0.001) and
test stimulus (F(1,15) = 2811.29, p < 0.001), but again no effect
for condition (F(1,15) < 1, NS). Crucially, as in experiment 1,
there was also a significant adaptation side 3 condition inter-
action (F(1,15) = 5.91, p < 0.05). No other interactions were
significant.
As expected, separate analyses of the seeing and the non-
seeing condition as in experiment 1 yielded main effects of
test stimulus (both F(1,15)s > 1499.43, p < 0.001) but no signif-
icant interaction (both Fs < 1). The factor adaptation side
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26.29, p < 0.001) and the nonseeing condition (F(1,15) > 8.05,
p < 0.05). For the seeing condition, significant influences of
adaptation side were observed for test stimuli facing 5 right
(Z = 2.12, p < 0.05), straight ahead (Z = 2.48, p < 0.05), and 5
left (Z = 2.53, p < 0.05). In contrast, for the nonseeing condition,
effects of adaptation side again did not reach significance for
test stimuli gazing left or right (both Zs < 1.3, NS), though they
did for faces gazing straight ahead (Z = 2.13, p < 0.05).
The reliable aftereffect in this last case was the only one of
six nonseeing conditions across our two studies to reach
significance. One possibility is that the greater insistence in
experiment 2 on attending to the face had permitted a small
effect to arise in that study. However, given that the aftereffect
was still significant only in one of three nonseeing conditions, it
appears that gaze adaptation in the absence of the observer
attributing the mental state ‘‘seeing’’ to a face is minimal.
Moreover, this absence of an effect did not reflect reduced
allocation of spatial attention to the eye region of the face stim-
ulus in the nonseeing versus the seeing condition. Response
times to asterisks presented during the adaptation phase on
the face stimulus did not differ significantly for the seeing
and the nonseeing condition (t(15) = 1.19, NS).
Taken together, the results of the two experiments indicate
that the coding of gaze during adaptation must have been
differently influenced by the attribution of a ‘‘seeing’’ or a
‘‘nonseeing’’ mental state to the adaptation model. During
adaptation, the eyes of the model were never visible, and the
subsequent aftereffects might therefore have reflected coding
of the model’s eye direction inferred from head orientation
rather than coding of head orientation per se. In either case,
the finding that adaptation to head orientation transferred to
perception of eye direction implicates mechanisms that exploit
both sources of orientation information, paralleling findings in
the primate brain [5, 6]. Although eye direction is an important
social cue of where others are looking, the availability of this
information diminishes dramatically with increasing distance
between the observed individual and the observer. Consid-
ering these ecological constraints, a system that exploits
various sources might be necessary to yield reliable estimates
of where others are looking.
A particular advantage of our method is that physical differ-
ences between the stimuli cannot explain our results; the only
variable that differed consistently across observers between
seeing and nonseeing conditions was observers’ belief with
Figure 2. Mean Combined Scores of Gaze-Direc-
tion Judgment for the Test Stimuli 5 Left,
Straight, and 5 Right in the Seeing and the Non-
seeing Condition
A positive value indicates a bias to judge gaze
direction as left; a negative value indicates
a bias to the right. Note that the y axis is broken.
(A) Experiment 1.
(B) Experiment 2.
respect to the adaptation model’s ability
to see. Previous studies provide some
indication that high-level social cogni-
tion and face categorization can influ-
ence the allocation of spatial attention
in response to a gaze cue [19, 20].
However, our findings demonstrate for
the first time that the sensory coding of
a gaze cue’s physical characteristics can be top-down modu-
lated by mental-state attribution.
At first glance, the adaptive advantage of such a sophisti-
cated system might not be apparent. However, recent studies
in object recognition suggest that, in processing nonsocial
information, the brain exploits both feedforward and feedback
informational flow between areas implicated in low-level
perception and areas responsible for higher-order belief
formation when dealing with complex and ambiguous informa-
tion (e.g., [21–23]). Similarly, within the social domain, top-
down modulation of social perception by mental-state attribu-
tion might be necessary to guarantee optimal performance of
the basic gaze-processing system in natural scenes. In our
experimental design, physically identical-looking gaze cues
had radically different meanings, signaling that the model
either could or could not see. In everyday life, similar situations
might occur in complex social settings in which various poten-
tial targets and barriers between looker and target are the
norm. In order to disambiguate these situations, a gaze-
processing system as sophisticated as demonstrated in the
current study might be necessary.
From a neuropsychological perspective, the most important
interpretative issue arising from the current results concerns
the level at which an observer’s belief about another person’s
ability to see influences the neural representation of where
others are looking. Our psychophysical procedure does not
speak further to the localization of such effects in the brain.
In principle, they could arises entirely in the STS; however,
given the sophistication of the sociocognitive manipulation
that influenced gaze coding in our studies, it would seem
certain that areas implicated in mental-state attribution such
as the medial prefrontal cortex and the temporoparietal junc-
tion [24–27] are necessary for the reported subtleties of gaze
processing. Both regions are closely associated with the STS.
Accordingly, it would appear that our effects reflect top-down
modulation of gaze processing in the STS by prefrontal and
temporoparietal regions recruited by the attribution of mental
states. Specifically, this system appears to control the depth of
gaze processing.
In summary, our findings indicate a bidirectional relationship
between gaze processing and the system responsible for
mental-state attribution. Previous studies have demonstrated
that observed gaze direction can be used to infer another
person’s mental states such as attention (e.g., [28, 29]). Here
we demonstrate that beliefs about another person’s ability to
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effects on gaze processing. With respect to the particular
case of human observers, this finding provides clear evidence
for Perrett and colleagues’ [5] view—initially suggested for
nonhuman primates—that gaze processing reflects another
person’s direction of attention. Note, however, that according
to our hypothesis, it is not the gaze-sensitive cells in the STS
themselves that represent this mental state, but the interaction
between the gaze-processing and the mentalizing system.
Together with a recent study in action perception [30], this
sophisticated interplay between social perception and social
mentalistic beliefs might point toward a more general effect
of high-level mental-state attribution in facilitating and shaping
the way in which social signals are processed on a lower level.
Experimental Procedures
Observers
Twenty observers (9 female, 11 male, mean 25 years) and 16 observers (13
female, 3 male, mean 25 years) participated in experiment 1 and experiment
2, respectively. In each experiment, one additional observer was excluded
because their gaze-direction judgment during the training session was
less than 60% correct (more than two standard deviations below the group
mean), indicating general problems in judging gaze direction. All but three
observers in experiment 1 and two in experiment 2 reported that they
were convinced that the prerecorded videos showed two real people.
Observers gave written consent, received payment, and were fully de-
briefed. The study was approved by a local ethics committee. Materials,
stimuli, and design are summarized in Figure 1 and described in detail in
the Supplemental Experimental Procedures available online.
Analysis
In order to assess the observer’s acuity in judging gaze direction, left
responses were assigned a 1, straight responses a 0, and right responses
a 21. These scores were added up for each test stimulus category (5 left,
straight, 5 right) within each test phase, resulting in one combined measure
of gaze-direction judgment. The stronger an observer’s tendency to judge
gaze direction as left, the more positive this combined measure was;
a stronger tendency to judge gaze direction as right resulted in a more nega-
tive score. Accordingly, a score of 10 indicates that observers always judged
gaze direction as left, and a score of 210 indicates that they always judged
gaze direction as right. This type of coding is sensitive to the direction of
deviation from a correct response and is thus more appropriate than the
use of the percentage of straight responses as in previous studies.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include Supplemental Experimental Procedures and
can be found with this article online at http://www.cell.com/current-
biology/supplemental/S0960-9822(09)01248-2.
Acknowledgments
We thank A. Skrzeszewska for assistance with editing videos and M. Aitken
and Z. Dienes for statistical advice. This work was supported by grants
awarded to C.T. by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the
Cambridge European Trust, and the Cambridge Philosophical Society.
Received: March 10, 2009
Revised: May 26, 2009
Accepted: May 27, 2009
Published online: June 25, 2009
References
1. Adolphs, R. (2009). The social brain: Neural basis of social knowledge.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 60, 693–716.
2. Emery, N.J. (2000). The eyes have it: The neuroethology, function and
evolution of social gaze. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 24, 581–604.
3. Frith, C.D., and Frith, U. (2007). Social cognition in humans. Curr. Biol.
17, R724–R732.4. Langton, S.R.H. (2000). The mutual influence of gaze and head orienta-
tion in the analysis of social attention direction. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 53,
825–845.
5. Perrett, D.I., Hietanen, J.K., Oram, M.W., and Benson, P.J. (1992). Orga-
nization and functions of cells responsive to faces in the temporal
cortex. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 335, 23–30.
6. Perrett, D.I., Smith, P.A.J., Potter, D.D., Mistlin, A.J., Head, A.S., Milner,
A.D., and Jeeves, M.A. (1985). Visual cells in the temporal cortex sensi-
tive to face view and gaze direction. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 223,
293–317.
7. Calder, A.J., Beaver, J.D., Winston, J.S., Dolan, R.J., Jenkins, R., Eger,
E., and Henson, R.N.A. (2007). Separate coding of different gaze direc-
tions in the superior temporal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule. Curr.
Biol. 17, 20–25.
8. Jenkins, R., Beaver, J.D., and Calder, A.J. (2006). I thought you were
looking at me: Direction-specific aftereffects in gaze perception.
Psychol. Sci. 17, 506–513.
9. Frisby, J.P. (1979). Seeing: Illusion, Brain and Mind (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
10. Clifford, C.W.G., and Rhodes, G. (2005). Fitting the Mind to the World
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
11. Leopold, D.A., O’Toole, A.J., Vetter, T., and Blanz, V. (2001). Prototype-
referenced shape encoding revealed by high-level after effects. Nat.
Neurosci. 4, 89–94.
12. Webster, M.A., and MacLin, O.H. (1999). Figural aftereffects in the
perception of faces. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 6, 647–653.
13. Pellicano, E., Jeffery, L., Burr, D., and Rhodes, G. (2007). Abnormal
adaptive face-coding mechanisms in children with autism spectrum
disorder. Curr. Biol. 17, 1508–1512.
14. Schweinberger, S.R., Kloth, N., and Jenkins, R. (2007). Are you looking
at me? Neural correlates of gaze adaptation. Neuroreport 18, 693–696.
15. Calder, A.J., Jenkins, R., Cassel, A., and Clifford, C.W.G. (2008). Visual
representation of eye gaze is coded by a nonopponent multichannel
system. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 137, 244–261.
16. Seyama, J., and Nagayama, R.S. (2006). Eye direction aftereffect.
Psychol. Res. 70, 59–67.
17. Seyama, J. (2006). Effect of image orientation on the eye direction after-
effect. Psychol. Res. 70, 367–374.
18. Langton, S.R.H., Watt, R.J., and Bruce, V. (2000). Do the eyes have it?
Cues to the direction of social attention. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 50–59.
19. Ristic, J., and Kingstone, A. (2005). Taking control of reflexive social
attention. Cognition 94, B55–B65.
20. Nuku, P., and Bekkering, H. (2008). Joint attention: Inferring what others
perceive (and don’t perceive). Conscious. Cogn. 17, 339–349.
21. Fletcher, P.C., and Frith, C.D. (2009). Perceiving is believing: A Bayesian
approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 10, 48–58.
22. Friston, K., Kilner, J., and Harrison, L. (2006). A free energy principle for
the brain. J. Physiol (Paris) 100, 70–87.
23. Gilbert, C.D., and Sigman, M. (2007). Brain states: Top-down influences
in sensory processing. Neuron 54, 677–696.
24. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Chiavarino, C., and Humphreys, G.W. (2004).
Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone
else’s belief. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 499–500.
25. Fletcher, P.C., Happe´, F., Frith, U., Baker, S.C., Dolan, R.J., Frackowiak,
R.S.J., and Frith, C.D. (1995). Other minds in the brain: a functional
imaging study of ‘‘theory of mind’’ in story comprehension. Cognition
57, 109–128.
26. Amodio, D.M., and Frith, C.D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial
frontal cortex and social cognition. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 268–277.
27. Saxe, R. (2006). Uniquely human social cognition. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.
16, 235–239.
28. Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
29. Calder, A.J., Lawrence, A.D., Keane, J., Scott, S.K., Owen, A.M., Chris-
toffels, I., and Young, A.W. (2002). Reading the mind from eye gaze.
Neuropsychologia 40, 1129–1138.
30. Liepelt, R., von Cramon, D.Y., and Brass, M. (2008). What is matched in
direct matching? Intention attribution modulates motor priming. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 34, 578–591.
